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Abstract—In the Internet of Things (IoT) context,
the massive proliferation of wireless devices implies
dense networks that require cooperation for the mul-
tihop transmission of the sensor data to central units.
The altruistic user behavior and the isolation of ma-
licious users are fundamental requirements for the
proper operation of any cooperative network. However,
the introduction of new communication techniques that
improve the cooperative performance (e.g., network
coding) hinders the application of traditional schemes
on malicious users detection, which are mainly based on
packet overhearing. In this paper, we introduce a non-
parametric statistical approach, based on the Kruskal-
Wallis method, for the detection of user misbehavior
in network coding scenarios. The proposed method is
shown to eﬀectively handle attacks in the network,
even when malicious users adopt a smart probabilistic
misbehavior.
Index Terms—Security, misbehavior, packet forward-
ing, cooperative communications, RLNC.
I. Introduction
The introduction of the Internet of Things (IoT) concept
implies an explosive growth in the number of wireless
devices. As a result of the network densiﬁcation, in IoT sce-
narios, cooperative communication constitutes an intrinsic
network mechanism, whose functional operation relies on
the active participation of various intermediaries (relays)
that forward the data to the ﬁnal destination. However,
this collaboration should not be taken for granted, as it
requires valuable energy and capacity resources from the
relays, especially in wireless networks, where the radio
resources are limited and the nodes are typically battery-
powered devices. In addition, these networks are more
susceptible to security attacks by malicious adversaries
due to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium.
In this context, the design of security-oriented solutions
for the network protection against selﬁsh and malicious
users has become of utmost importance, motivating sev-
eral research works that can be classiﬁed in two main
categories [1]: i) proactive mechanisms [2] that base their
operation on the development of a network of trust, either
by providing the participating nodes with incentives to
cooperate or building reputation tables that ensure the
exclusion of the misbehaving users, and ii) reactive mech-
anisms [3]–[5], which adopt a real-time approach, as the
wireless nodes monitor the network activity by overhearing
the transmissions or employing special control packets for
the end-to-end communication.
The simplicity and scalability of the reactive techniques
have made them ideal candidates for security provision in
current networks, whose topology is particularly volatile,
with several opportunistic users participating in the net-
work according to their temporary location and needs.
However, these mechanisms suﬀer from increased power
consumption and packet overhead, while the introduction
of network coding [6] is an additional prohibitive factor
for their application in current large-scale networks. More
speciﬁcally, the network coded packets complicate further
the network monitoring, since they are linear combina-
tions of single packets and no longer easily tractable by
conventional schemes. In addition, the explicit packet ac-
knowledgements have been replaced by cumulative reports
[7], which verify the reception of several packets and also
identify the portion of information that the node has
received by each relay.
The introduction of these new control packets raises
a fundamental question: How reliable are these reports?
More speciﬁcally, two types of fake reporting have been
identiﬁed [2]: i) under-reporting, where a node (type U)
acknowledges a portion of information lower than the
actually received, and ii) over-reporting, where a node
(type O) acknowledges a portion of information higher
than the actually received. By trusting these reports, in
the former case, a well-behaved relay can be characterized
as “bad” or “selﬁsh”, while, in the latter case, a relay node
that does not participate in the packet forwarding can
be characterized as “good” or “cooperative”. Apparently,
in IoT large-scale networks the problem is escalated with
the massive existence of devices that generate a plethora
of reports, stressing the need for new methods for the
eﬀective detection of malicious users.
In this paper, we introduce a nonparametric statistical
technique for the detection of malicious users in packet
forwarding in network-coding-aided mobile networks. The
proposed method is based on the Kruskal-Wallis statistical
test [8] and examines whether all the control packets have
been generated by a single population (i.e., honest users).
It is worth noting that it does not require additional over-
head or monitoring, thus being ﬂexible and appropriate
for dynamic IoT scenarios.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The system
model and the evaluation of the impact of malicious activ-
ity are provided in Section II. The proposed framework is
introduced in Section III and its performance is assessed
in Section IV. Finally, Section V concludes this paper.
II. System Model
A. System Model
We consider the network in Fig. 1, where a given node
(A) transmits network coded information to a set of M
nodes C = {Cm : 0 < m ≤ M}. In periodic time intervals,
these nodes issue a report rm(t) ∈ {0, 1} that characterizes
the behavior of node A, i.e., rm(t) = 1 and rm(t) = 0 de-
note that A is a cooperative or a selﬁsh node, respectively.
Therefore, given that the time between two consecutive
reports is Tr, the report generation is a discrete random
process, denoted by {rm(t) : t = t0 + nTr, n ∈ Z}, where
t0 is the time when the ﬁrst report was generated.
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Fig. 1. System Model
Adopting a similar notation for the behavior of node
A, we deﬁne the binary variable B(t) ∈ {0, 1}, which
is either 1 or 0 in case that node A is cooperative or
selﬁsh, respectively. Assuming that all network users are
honest, under ideal channel conditions, it should hold
that rm(t) = B(t),∀t. However, there are unpredictable
factors (e.g., the nature of the wireless medium) that could
aﬀect the communication and cause the generation of false
reports, while the existence of malicious users should not
be neglected. In our work, we consider potential channel
errors as a probability of false reports (pe) and we also take
into account the probability of deliberate fake reports (pf ).
All generated reports at time t are collected by a central
entity, which is responsible for the correct network oper-
ation (i.e., network administrator) and makes a decision
dc(t) about node A. This decision is made according to the
majority of these reports, which is a special but common
case of the widely employed “k-out-of-n” decision rule [9],
and can be mathematically expressed as
dCE(t) =
{
1 , if
∑M
m=1 rm(t) ≥ M/2
0 , otherwise
. (1)
B. Impact of Malicious Activity
As the central entity does not have any clue about the
behavior B(t) of a given node, its decision dCE(t) is exclu-
sively based on the received reports from the other nodes.
Therefore, the reception and analysis of fake reports could
mislead the central entity and alter the correct decision,
causing serious malfunctions in the network. Let us deﬁne
as δm(t) = rm(t)
⊕
dCE(t), δm(t) ∈ {0, 1} the binary
variable that compares a particular report with the ﬁnal
decision in order to capture the potential discrepancies.
Apparently, δm(t) = 0 when the report coincides with the
central decision, while δm(t) = 1 when the report diﬀers
from the decision. However, the identiﬁcation of malicious
users cannot be made based only on these instantaneous
reports, mainly due to the dynamic nature of the wireless
medium. More speciﬁcally, there is always the possibility
that some transmissions are not received owing to channel
errors and the destination node may falsely characterize
the corresponding relay as non-cooperative. As a result,
the study of the reports’ discrepancies through time is
essential to improve the decision’s robustness. To that end,
we focus on the average value of δm in a sequence of L
consecutive feedback periods rather than the speciﬁc δm(t)
value. The expected value can be deﬁned as
Dm = E[δm] =
1
L
L−1∑
n=0
δm(t − n · Tr). (2)
In order to study and identify the diﬀerent behaviors in
the network, we need to focus on the properties of Dm.
Since δm is a binary variable, Dm can take L + 1 discrete
values di = iL , where i ∈ Z and i ∈ [0, L]. Therefore, the
range of Dm can be deﬁned as D = {d0, d1, ..., dL}, with
probability mass function (pmf)
fDm(di) = Pr(Dm = di), di ∈ D (3)
and
fDm(di) = 0, di /∈ D. (4)
For the comprehensive demonstration of the user dis-
crepancies, Fig. 2 provides an example of fDm in case
of a malicious user of type U (Fig. 2(a)) and type O
(Fig. 2(b)), considering four diﬀerent combinations of
{|Uh|, |MU |, |MO|} users in the network, that is {5,1,1},
{5,2,2}, {5,3,3}, and {5,4,4}. The plots in Fig. 2 reveal
that, in our case, the normality assumption that would
allow the application of parametric statistical methods
(e.g., analysis of variance or ANOVA) is too strict, thus
stressing the need for nonparametric approaches.
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Fig. 2. Probability mass function (fDm ) for diﬀerent types of
malicious users(1000 reports, L = 5, B(t) = 0, pf = 0.7, pe = 0.1)
III. Cooperative Nonparametric Statistical
Detection of Malicious Users
In this section, we introduce a nonparametric statistical
scheme for the detection of malicious activity in network-
coding-enabled wireless networks. The proposed scheme
is based on the Kruskal-Wallis method, which is a rank-
based statistical test, able to detect whether diﬀerent sets
of samples belong to the same probability distribution.
The nonparametric statistical methods are mainly based
on the analysis of the median, as no normality is assumed
in the distribution of the samples. In particular, median
is described as the numeric value separating the higher
half of a probability distribution from the lower half, thus
being less sensitive than the mean value to vulnerabilities
such as outliers and data distribution. Deﬁning as ηm the
median of Dm, the null hypothesis H0 and the alternative
hypothesis H1 of the statistical Kruskal-Wallis test can be
expressed as
{
H0 : η1 = η2 = . . . = ηM
H1 : ηmi = ηmj for at least one mi = mi.
(5)
The acceptance of the null hypothesis suggests that the
diﬀerences between the medians of the diﬀerent samples
are not signiﬁcant and, therefore, all M random vari-
ables are assumed to have been generated by the same
population. On the other hand, the rejection of the null
hypothesis implies that the M random variables have been
generated by diﬀerent populations, something that veriﬁes
the existence of malicious users in the network.
The creation of the database of these samples is funda-
mental for the application of the proposed method. More
speciﬁcally, at a given time instant t, the central entity
collects the reports of M nodes and makes a decision
about node A according to the majority of these reports.
Subsequently, as also explained in Sec. II-B, it compares
this decision with the individual reports and generates M
δm binary variables and, after L received reports by each
node, we obtain one single sample for the variable Dm.
However, the application of statistical methods requires
several samples, hereafter denoted by Q, while the non-
parametric statistics are based on the ranks of the samples,
rather than their actual values. Hence, given a set of
samples S = {Dm(t − qTD) : 1 ≤ m ≤ M, 0 ≤ q ≤ Q − 1},
the rank of each sample Dm(t − qTD) is denoted by
rm(t − qTD) and is equal to the number of observations
in the set S that are smaller or equal to Dm(t − qTD).
Accordingly, the test statistic can be written as [8]
H = 1
σ2
[
M∑
m=1
R2m
Q
− N(N + 1)
2
4
]
, (6)
where N corresponds to the total number of samples (i.e.,
N = MQ), σ2 is the variance of the ranks, calculated as
σ2 = 1
N − 1
[
Q−1∑
q=
M∑
m=1
rm(t− qTD)2 − N(N + 1)
2
4
]
, (7)
and Rm is the total sum of the individual ranks for node
m, equal to
Rm =
Q∑
q=0
rm(t − qTD). (8)
In practice, the behavior of H can be approximated by
the chi-square distribution with M −1 degrees of freedom.
Hence, since high values of H imply that H0 is false, the
null hypothesis is rejected if
H ≥ χ2α,M−1, (9)
where α denotes the signiﬁcance level.
IV. Performance Assessment
We consider the system model in Fig. 1, where M nodes
receive random linear combinations of the data packets by
a particular intermediate node A. In regular time periods,
each one of the M nodes generates a report rm that
characterizes the behavior of node A (i.e., either selﬁsh or
cooperative). A central entity creates the database and,
gradually, every L samples computes the value of Dm.
Upon the collection of Q samples of Dm, the central entity
applies the Kruskal-Wallis method in order to detect any
malicious actions in the network. Regarding the nature of
the reports rm, we assume that the honest users provide
false reports with a probability pe due to channel errors,
while malicious users of type U and O provide deliberately
false reports with a probability pf when node R behaves
well and bad, respectively.
Fig. 3 presents the detection probability for diﬀerent sig-
niﬁcance levels, assuming two malicious users and various
cases of malicious user activity (i.e., pf = 0.15, pf = 0.20,
pf = 0.25 and pf = 0.30). We may observe that low
values of signiﬁcance level imply low detection probability,
especially when the malicious users are not particularly
aggressive (i.e., low pf ). However, as the malicious users
become more aggressive and the probability of transmit-
ting false reports increases, the algorithm is able to detect
them. More speciﬁcally, the proposed algorithm detects
any malicious activity with probability equal to 1 when the
malicious users have adopted a pf = 0.3. This practically
means that even if (nearly) only one out of three reports
is fake, the central entity will detect this activity.
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Fig. 3. Detection Probability vs. Signiﬁcance Level α (|Uh| =
7, |MU | = 2, Q = 15, L = 10)
In Fig. 4, we study the impact of the number of mali-
cious users on the detection probability. More speciﬁcally,
we examine a topology with three honest users and a
variable number (i.e., one to nine) of malicious users. In
all scenarios, the signiﬁcance level has been deﬁned equal
to α = 0.05 and various cases for the probability of fake
reports pf are considered. It is worth noting that the
number of malicious users slightly aﬀects the detection
probability when pf is relatively low (e.g., pf = 0.15),
something that can be explained taking into account that
the probability of false reports due to channel errors is
very close to this value (i.e., pe = 0.10), hindering the
distinction between malicious users and users with bad
channel conditions. In this case, the reports seem to be
generated by a single population, especially when there is
only one malicious user in the system. On the other hand,
as the probability of misbehavior grows, the detection
probability signiﬁcantly increases.
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced a novel cooperative non-
parametric statistical method for the mitigation of user
misbehavior in network-coding-aided scenarios. The op-
eration of the proposed scheme is based on the process-
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Fig. 4. Detection Probability vs Number of Malicious Users (α =
0.05, Q = 15, L = 10)
ing of existing control packets and does not require any
additional overhead. Through extensive experiments, we
have shown that the proposed method detects eﬃciently
the malicious users in the network, even when they adopt
a ﬂexible probabilistic misbehavior (e.g., by transmitting
only one out of three fake reports). In our future work,
we plan to extend our method in order to identify the
malicious activity.
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